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Abstract—In this paper, we consider simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer (SWIPT) in relay interference
channels, where multiple source-destination pairs communicate
through their dedicated energy harvesting relays. Each relay
needs to split its received signal from sources into two streams:
one for information forwarding and the other for energy harvest-
ing. We develop a distributed power splitting framework using
game theory to derive a profile of power splitting ratios for
all relays that can achieve a good network-wide performance.
Specifically, non-cooperative games are respectively formulated
for pure amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF)
networks, in which each link is modeled as a strategic player who
aims to maximize its own achievable rate. The existence and
uniqueness for the Nash equilibriums (NEs) of the formulated
games are analyzed and a distributed algorithm with provable
convergence to achieve the NEs is also developed. Subsequently,
the developed framework is extended to the more general
network setting with mixed AF and DF relays. All the theoretical
analyses are validated by extensive numerical results. Simulation
results show that the proposed game-theoretical approach can
achieve a near-optimal network-wide performance on average,
especially for the scenarios with relatively low and moderate
interference.
Index Terms—Simultaneous wireless information and power
transfer (SWIPT), RF energy harvesting, relay interference chan-
nel, distributed power splitting, game theory, Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Harvesting energy from the environment has been regarded
as a promising technique to prolong the lifetime of energy
constrained wireless networks, e.g., sensor networks. Apart
from the conventional renewable energy sources such as solar
and wind, radio frequency (RF) signals radiated by ambient
transmitters can be treated as a viable new source for wireless
power transfer. In addition, RF signals have been widely used
for wireless information transmission. Therefore, simultaneous
wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) [2] has be-
come a promising approach to enable new ways of information
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and energy delivery. The basic concept of SWIPT was first
proposed in [2]. A comprehensive receiver architecture and
the corresponding rate-energy tradeoff were developed in [3].
Inspired by these two seminal results, SWIPT schemes for
wireless networks have attracted a lot of attention recently.
SWIPT schemes for MIMO broadcasting channels and MISO
interference channels were designed and evaluated in [4]
and [5], respectively. The resource allocation algorithms for
SWIPT in broadband wireless systems were investigated in
[6], while an energy-efficient resource allocation algorithm
was developed in [7] for SWIPT in OFDMA systems.
Recently, Nasir et al. extended the idea of SWIPT to a
simple three-node relay network in [8], where the energy
constrained relay node harvests energy from the source sig-
nal to enable forwarding the received signal. Two practical
relaying protocols were proposed for the considered relay
network. Analytical expressions for the outage probability
and the ergodic capacity of the proposed protocols were de-
rived for delay-limited and delay-tolerant modes, respectively.
This work was further extended in [9], by considering an
adaptive time-switching protocol for SWIPT relaying network
and analytical expressions of the achievable throughput were
derived for both amplify-and-forward and decode-and-forward
relaying networks. A similar idea for SWIPT in two-way
relaying networks was proposed and analyzed in [10]. Very
recently, [11] considered SWIPT in a larger relay network,
where multiple source-destination pairs communicate with
each other via a common energy harvesting relay. Specifically,
several power allocation schemes were proposed to efficiently
distribute the power harvested at the relay among multiple
pairs.
In cooperative networks, the relay interference channel is
an important model that has many practical applications, such
as cellular networks, wireless sensor networks, WLANs etc.
[12]–[17]. In this model, multiple source-destination pairs
communicate with the help of dedicated relays using the same
spectral resources1. However, to the best of our knowledge,
no work in the open literature has considered SWIPT in
relay interference channels except [18]. Note that although
[8]–[11] also designed SWIPT for relay networks, none of
them considered relay interference channels. By using the
advanced stochastic geometry theory, [18] analyzed the outage
performance of SWIPT in large-scale networks with/without
relaying, where the transmitters and the relays (if they exist)
1Such a model is also called two-hop interference channels since the
multiple source-relay-destination links, which constitute a cascade of two
interference channels, transmit and interfere in each hop.
2are assumed to be connected to a power supply, while the
receivers harvest the energy from the signals received from
the source and relay based on a power splitting technique [3].
In this paper, we also focus on the design of SWIPT in
relay interference channels. Different from [18] in the model,
objective, and approach, we consider that multiple source-
destination pairs communicate simultaneously with the help
of their dedicated RF energy harvesting relays, which do not
have their own power supply and need to harvest energy
from the source signal before forwarding. Each relay node
splits the signal received from all source nodes into two
parts according to a power splitting ratio: one part is sent
to the information processing unit, and the rest is used to
harvest energy for forwarding the received information in the
second time slot. We consider that each link’s performance
is characterized by its achievable rate and thus regard the
sum-rate of all links as a network-wide performance metric.
The first natural question that arises from this system is “how
should the relays split their received signals for information
receiving and energy harvesting in order to achieve a good
network-wide performance?”. This is actually a very complex
question to answer. The reason is that the power splitting
ratio of each link not only affects the performance of this
link, but also affects the performance of other links due to
mutual interference between different links. This means that
the optimization of each ratio depends on all other ratios and
they are tangled together. Moreover, the maximization of the
sum-rate of all links is shown to be a non-convex optimization
problem. The global optimal power splitting ratios cannot be
efficiently achieved even in a centralized fashion, and there is a
heavy signaling overhead required by the centralized method.
To tackle the aforementioned problem, we apply the well-
established game theory to develop a distributed power split-
ting framework for SWIPT in relay interference channels. We
investigate both pure and hybrid networks in this paper. In a
pure network, all relays adopt the same relaying protocol. Con-
sidering that amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying and decode-
and-forward (DF) relaying protocols are most-frequently used
in practice [19], we further classify a pure network into a pure
AF network and a pure DF network. On the other hand, in a
hybrid network, a mixture of AF and DF relaying protocols
are implemented at the relays. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first game-theoretical framework for the design of
SWIPT in relay interference channels. The main contributions
of the paper are summarized as follows:
• We develop a distributed power splitting framework for
the SWIPT in relay interference channels. In particular,
each source-relay-destination link in the relay interfer-
ence channels is modeled as a strategic player who
chooses its dedicated relay’s power splitting ratio to
maximize its individual rate.
• We analyze the existence and uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium (NE) for the formulated game in the pure net-
work, where all relays employ either AF or DF relaying
protocol. In addition, a distributed algorithm is proposed
with provable convergence to achieve the NEs.
• The theoretical analysis for the pure networks is then
extended to a more general hybrid network with mixed
Fig. 1. System model for interference relay channels.
AF and DF relays coexisting.
• All analytical results are validated by extensive numer-
ical simulations, which show that the proposed game-
theoretical approach can achieve a near-optimal network-
wide performance on average.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the system model. In Section III, we present
the proposed game-theoretical power splitting framework for
the pure networks, where the non-cooperative games are
formulated for the pure AF and pure DF networks, followed
by the existence and uniqueness analysis of the NEs as well as
the development of the distributed algorithm. The extension of
the proposed framework to the hybrid network is discussed in
Section IV. Numerical results are provided in Section V and
conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider SWIPT in a system with relay interference
channels, as depicted in Fig. 1. The system consists of N
source-relay-destination (S-R-D) links and the set of these
links is denoted as N = {1, . . . , N}. More specifically, in the
link Si → Ri → Di, i ∈ N , the source Si communicates with
its corresponding destination Di, assisted by a dedicated relay
Ri. The relay nodes can employ either AF or DF relaying
schemes [20]. The direct source-destination channels are ne-
glected due to a high path loss and shadowing attenuation.
Since these two-hop links share the same spectrum, they
interfere with each other over the dual hops.
We assume that all the nodes (i.e., sources, relays and
destinations) are equipped with only one antenna and operate
in a half-duplex mode. The relay nodes do not have their
own power supply and need to harvest energy from the
received signal in order to forward the received signal to
the destinations. It is assumed that the energy harvesting and
information transmission are implemented for every received
message block. For the purpose of exposition, the processing
power consumed by the transmit/receive circuitry at the relay
nodes is assumed to be negligible as compared to the power
used for signal forwarding [8]. Moreover, we consider that all
links experience slow and frequency-flat fading.
Let gij and hij denote the channel gain from Si to Rj in the
first hop and from Ri to Dj in the second hop, respectively.
3In the first time slot, all sources transmit simultaneously and
the signal received by the relay Ri can be written as
yRi =
√
Pigiixi +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i
√
Pjgjixj + n
a
i , (1)
where Pi and xi are the fixed transmit power and the trans-
mitted information of the source Si with E
{
|xi|2
}
= 1,
nai ∼ CN
(
0, σ2i,a
)
is the additive noise introduced by the
receiver antenna at the relay Ri.
Subsequently, the received signal at the relay Ri is split
into two streams, with the power splitting ratio ρi, as shown
in Fig. 2. The fraction √ρi of the received signal is used
for energy harvesting, while the remaining one is sent to the
information processing unit. In practice, the antenna noise nai
has a negligible impact on both the information receiving and
energy harvesting, since σ2i,a is generally much smaller than
the noise power introduced by the baseband processing circuit,
and thus even lower than the average power of the received
signal [21]. For simplicity, we ignore the noise term nai in the
following analysis, i.e., setting σ2i,a = 0 [21]. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume a normalized transmission time for
each hop (i.e., the transmission duration of each hop is equal
to one). Then, the terms “energy” and “power” can be used
interchangeably. In this case, the energy harvested at relay Ri
can thus be expressed as
Qi = ηρi
∑N
n=1
Pn|gni|2, (2)
where 0 < η ≤ 1 is the energy conversion efficiency that
depends on the rectification process and the energy harvesting
circuit. Meanwhile, the information signal received by the
information processing unit at relay Ri is given by
yIRi =
√
1− ρiyRi + nbi
=
√
1− ρi
√
Pigiixi +
√
1− ρi×∑N
j=1,j 6=i
√
Pjgjixj + n
b
i ,
(3)
where nbi ∼ CN
(
0, σ2Ri
)
is the additive white Gaussian noise
introduced by the signal processing circuit from passband
to baseband. Then, in the second time slot, the relay nodes
will exhaust2 the harvested energy to forward the information
signal yIRi by employing either AF or DF relaying protocol. In
the following subsections, we derive the expressions for the
achievable rates of the ith link for the AF and DF relaying
protocols, respectively.
A. AF Relaying
When the AF relaying scheme is adopted, the relay node
Ri will exhaust the harvested energy to amplify and forward
the signal received by the information processing unit in the
first time slot. Thus, the transmit power of the relay Ri is Qi
2Generally, the relay nodes may be interested in keeping part of the energy
harvested from the RF signals. In this paper, we consider the relay protocol
to maximize achievable rate of each link. In this regard, the relay should
exhaust the harvested energy to forward the source information and thus has
no incentive to keep any part of energy.
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Fig. 2. The diagram of the power splitting technique at the relay nodes.
and the received signal at the destination Di can be expressed
as [19]
yAFDi =
√
Qihiiβiy
I
Ri +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i
√
Qjhjiβjy
I
Rj + nDi
=
√
Qihiiβi
√
1− ρi
√
Pigiixi+√
Qihiiβi
√
1− ρi
∑N
j=1,j 6=i
√
Pjgjixj+
√
Qihiiβin
b
i +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i
√
Qjhjiβjy
I
Rj + nDi ,
(4)
where
βi = 1/
√√√√(1− ρi)Pi|gii|2 + (1− ρi)
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Pj |gji|2 + σ2Ri
is the power constraint factor at the relay Ri, and nDi ∼
CN (0, σ2Di) is the additive white noise at the destination Di.
Without loss of generality, we hereafter assume that σ2Ri =
σ2Di = σ
2
, for any i ∈ N . The second equality of (4) is
obtained by inserting the expression of yIRi given by (3) into
the first equality of (4). Note that only the first term on the
right-hand side of the second equality in (4) is the useful signal
to the destination Di, while the remaining terms should be
regarded as interference plus noise. Based on this observation
and after some algebraic manipulations, we can write the end-
to-end signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the ith
link as (5) on top of next page, where
Xi = Pi|gii|2/σ2, (6a)
Yi =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i
Pj |gji|2/σ2, (6b)
Zi = η
(∑N
n=1
Pn|gni|2
)
|hii|2/σ2, (6c)
Wi =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i
ρjη
(∑N
n=1
Pn|gnj |2
)
|hji|2/σ2, (6d)
are defined for the simplicity of notations. It is worth noticing
that the above equations (6a)-(6d) have physical meanings.
More specifically, (6a) and (6b) respectively denote the signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) and the interference-to-noise ratio (INR)
at the relay Ri when the received signal is fully forwarded to
Di without harvesting any energy at the relay (i.e., ρi = 0).
On the other hand, (6c) represents the SNR at the destination
Di when the received signal of the relay Ri is fully used for
energy harvesting (i.e., ρi = 1). Finally, (6d) is the INR at the
destination Di.
Then, the achievable rate of the link i when the AF relaying
technique is employed at its dedicated relay can be expressed
4γAFi =
ρi (1− ρi)XiZi
ρi (1− ρi)YiZi + (1− ρi) (Xi + Yi) (Wi + 1) + ρiZi +Wi + 1 (5)
as
uAFi (ρ) =
1
2
log
(
1 + γAFi
)
, (7)
where ρ = [ρ1, . . . , ρN ]T denotes the vector of all links’ power
splitting ratios.
B. DF Relaying
For the case when the DF relaying protocol is employed,
the relay node will first decode the information based on the
received information signal yIRi given in (3). Thus, the received
SINR at relay Ri can be written as
γDFi,1 =
(1− ρi)Xi
(1− ρi)Yi + 1 , (8)
where Xi and Yi are defined in (6a) and (6b), respectively.
In the second time slot, the relay nodes forward the decoded
information to their corresponding destinations using the en-
ergy harvested in the first time slot. The received signal at Di
is given by
yDi =
√
Qihiixi +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i
√
Qjhjixj + nDi . (9)
The received SINR at the destination Di can thus be written
as
γDFi,2 =
ρiZi
Wi + 1
, (10)
where Zi and Wi are defined in (6c) and (6d), respectively.
The achievable rate of the ith link in this case is thus given
by
uDFi (ρ) =
1
2
min
(
log
(
1 + γDFi,1
)
, log
(
1 + γDFi,2
))
=
1
2
log
(
1 + γDFi
)
,
(11)
where
γDFi = min
(
γDFi,1 , γ
DF
i,2
) (12)
can be regarded as the end-to-end SINR of the ith link with
a DF relay.
In this paper, we consider that each link’s performance is
characterized by its achievable rate and thus regard the sum-
rate of all links as a network-wide performance metric. In the
following sections, we will develop a distributed power split-
ting scheme to achieve a good network-wide performance.
III. DISTRIBUTED POWER SPLITTING FOR PURE
NETWORKS
In this section, we focus on the the design of distributed
power splitting for pure AF and DF networks, where all the
relay nodes employ the same relaying protocol, i.e., either AF
or DF relaying. To choose an efficient profile of the power
splitting ratios (i.e, ρ) that can achieve a globally optimal
network-wide performance, one needs to solve the following
network utility maximization problem:
max
ρ
∑N
i=1 u
X
i (ρ)
s.t. ρ ∈ A
, (13)
where X refers to AF (DF ) for the pure AF (DF) network,
uAFi (ρ) and uDFi (ρ) are respectively defined in (7) and (11),
and A = {ρ| 0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N} is the feasible set of ρ.
However, it can be easily checked that the optimization
problem in (13) is not convex for an AF network. Moreover,
for a DF network, the optimization problem in (13) is not only
non-convex but also non-differentiable due to the min operator.
This means that the globally optimal power splitting profile for
the pure network (i.e, the solution of (13)) cannot be efficiently
calculated even in a centralized fashion and there will be a
heavy signaling overhead required by the centralized method.
Motivated by this, we will develop a distributed framework
by considering that all links are strategic and they aim to
maximize their individual achievable rates by choosing their
own power splitting ratios. For example, in an AF network,
this will involve the ith link solving the following optimization
problem
max
ρi
uAFi (ρi, ρ−i)
s.t. ρi ∈ Ai
, (14)
where ρ−i = [ρ1, . . . , ρi−1, ρi+1, . . . ρN ]
T denotes the vector
of all links’ power splitting ratios, except the ith one, and
Ai = {ρi| 0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1} is the feasible set of the ith link’s
power splitting ratio.
We can observe from (14) that the optimization problem to
be solved by each link is coupled together due to the mutual
interference over two hops. To solve this problem, we model
the considered power splitting problem to be a non-cooperative
game in game theory [22]. Particularly, the considered power
splitting problem for an AF network can be modeled by the
following non-cooperative game:
• Players: The N S-R-D links.
• Actions: Each link determines its power splitting ratio
ρi ∈ Ai to maximize the achievable rate for its own link.
• Utilities: The achievable rate uAFi (ρi, ρ−i) defined in (7).
For convenience, we denote the formulated non-cooperative
game as
GAF =
〈N , {Ai} ,{uAFi (ρi, ρ−i)}〉 . (15)
Note that we regard each link consisting of three nodes as a
“virtual” single player for the sake of presentation. In practice,
each player is supposed to be one node of each link (e.g., relay)
that acts as the coordinator of each link.
Similarly, we can formulate the following non-cooperative
game for the DF network:
GDF =
〈N , {Ai} ,{uDFi (ρi, ρ−i)}〉 . (16)
5It is worth mentioning that although the structure of the games
formulated for the AF and DF networks is similar, their
solution analyses are actually quite different. So we discuss
them separately in the following subsections.
A. Existence of the Nash Equilibrium
The most well-known solution to the non-cooperative games
is the (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium (NE) [22]. A NE of a
given non-cooperative game 〈N , {Qn}, {Un (xn,x−n)}〉 is a
feasible point x∗ such that
U (x∗n,x∗−n) ≥ U (xn,x∗−n) , ∀xn ∈ Qn. (17)
In other words, a NE is a feasible strategy profile with the
property that no single player can increase the utility by
deviating from the strategy corresponding to the equilibrium,
given the strategies of the other players. The following theorem
proposed in [23] is usually adopted to verify the existence of
the NE:
Theorem 1: A NE exists in the game
〈N , {Qn}, {Un (xn,x−n)}〉 if ∀n ∈ N , Qn is a compact
and convex set; Un (q) is continuous in q and quasi-concave
in qn, where q = (qn,q−n).
After investigating the properties of the action sets and the
utility functions for the formulated games GAF and GDF , we
have the following proposition regrading the existence of the
NE:
Proposition 1: The utility function uAFi (ρi, ρ−i) is quasi-
concave in ρi for any i ∈ N . Moreover, the formulated power
splitting game GAF for the AF network possesses at least one
NE. Moreover, the formulated power splitting game GDF for
the DF network also admits at least one NE.
Proof: See Appendix A.
B. Uniqueness for the NE of the game GAF
Once the NE is shown to exist, a natural question that
arises is whether it is unique. This is important not only
for predicting the state of the network but also crucial for
convergence issues. In principle, the uniqueness of the NE can
be analyzed by several methods, which has been summarized
in [24]. However, since the formulated game GAF is not a
convex one, most of the methodologies cannot be applied
except the standard function approach [25] because, as shown
below, it only requires that the best response function satisfies
certain properties. To proceed, we first figure out the best
response functions of the links (players), for which we have
the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Given a power splitting strategy profile ρ, the
best response function of the link Si → Ri → Di in the game
GAF can be expressed as (18) on top of next page.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Now let us verify the correctness of the best re-
sponse function (18) by utilizing the special case that
(Xi + Yi) (Wi + 1) = Zi. If we insert this condition into the
expression of SINR (5), we can readily obtain that the SINR
is maximized when the term ρi (1− ρi) is maximized. This
implies that the best response ρ∗i = 1/2, which is consistent
with our previous analysis of the best response function. To
gain more insights, let us rewrite (Xi + Yi) (Wi + 1) = Zi
as Xi + Yi = Zi/ (Wi + 1). Then we can note that the left-
hand side of the previous equation represents the signal-plus-
interference-to-noise ratio of the first hop when the relay only
perform information forwarding (i.e., ρi = 0), while the right-
hand side denotes the SINR of the second hop with only
energy harvesting at the relay (i.e., ρi = 1). This special case
reveals that the relay Ri should equally split its received signal,
when the signal-plus-interference-to-noise ratio of the first hop
for ρi = 0 equals to the SINR of the second hop for ρi = 1.
We now define the vector function BAF (ρ) =[BAF1 (ρ) , . . . ,BAFN (ρ)]T . Then, according to the well-
known fixed point theorem [24], the strategy profile ρ∗ is
a NE of the formulated game GAF if and only if it is the
fixed point of the function BAF (ρ) (i.e, BAF (ρ∗) = ρ∗).
Hence, the uniqueness for the NE of the formulated game is
equivalent to that for the fixed point of the function BAF (ρ).
Furthermore, it is shown in [25] that the fixed point of the
function BAF (ρ) is unique if BAF (ρ) is a standard function.
The standard function is defined as follows:
Definition 1: A function f (x) is said to be standard if it
satisfies the following properties for all x ≥ 0:
• Positivity: f (x) > 0.
• Monotonicity: If x ≥ x′, then f (x) ≥ f (x′).
• Scalability: For all α > 1, αf (x) > f (αx).
Here, all the inequalities are componentwise.
After investigating the properties of the best response func-
tions given in Lemma 1, we have the following proposition
regarding the uniqueness of the NE:
Proposition 2: The formulated game GAF for the AF net-
work always admits a unique NE.
Proof: See Appendix C.
C. Uniqueness for the NE of the game GDF
To validate the uniqueness for the NE of the game
GDF , most of the methodologies also fail to apply except
the approach of standard function [25] due to the non-
differentiability of the utility functions (the min operator).
Similarly, we first derive the best response functions of the
links (players) in the game GDF and have the following
lemma:
Lemma 2: Given a power splitting strategy profile ρ, the
best response function of the link Si → Ri → Di in the game
GDF can be expressed as
BDFi (ρ) = [(XiWi +Xi + YiZi + Zi)−√
(XiWi +Xi − YiZi + Zi)2 + 4YiZ2i
]
/ (2YiZi) .
(19)
Proof: See Appendix D.
We now define the vector function BDF (ρ) =[BDF1 (ρ) , . . . ,BDFN (ρ)]T . After investigating the properties
of the function BDF (ρ), we have the following proposition
regarding the uniqueness of the NE:
Proposition 3: The game GDF also always possesses a
unique NE.
Proof: See Appendix E.
6BAFi (ρ) =


1
2 , if (Xi + Yi) (Wi + 1) = Zi√
(Xi+Yi+1)(Wi+1)√
(Xi+Yi+1)(Wi+1)+
√
Zi+Wi+1
, if (Xi + Yi) (Wi + 1) 6= Zi . (18)
Algorithm 1 : Distributed Power Splitting Algorithm for the
Pure Networks
1: Set t = 0 and each player (link) i ∈ N chooses a random power
splitting ratio ρi(0) from the feasible set Ai.
2: If a suitable termination criterion is satisfied: STOP.
3: Each link i ∈ N updates the power splitting ratio via executing
ρi(t+ 1) =
{
B
AF
i (ρ(t)) for AF network
B
DF
i (ρ(t)) for DF network
. (20)
4: t← t + 1; go to STEP 2.
D. Distributed Algorithm
So far, we have proved that the formulated games GAF
and GDF for pure networks always have a unique NE for
any channel conditions and network topologies. However, this
equilibrium is meaningful in practice only if one can develop
an algorithm that is able to achieve such an equilibrium
from non-equilibrium states. In this subsection, we propose a
distributed and iterative algorithm with provable convergence
to achieve the NE, in which the links update their power
splitting ratios simultaneously. In addition, we discuss the
practical implementation of the proposed algorithm.
1) Algorithm Description: Various kinds of distributed al-
gorithms have been proposed to find the NEs (see [26] for
more information). Here, we are interested in best response-
based algorithms since we have obtained the best response
functions of the formulated games. Relying on the derived best
response functions in (18) and (19), we develop a distributed
power splitting algorithm for the pure networks, which is for-
mally described in Algorithm 1. In terms of the convergence
of Algorithm 1, we have the following result:
Proposition 4: From any initial point, Algorithm 1 always
converges to the unique NE of the formulated games GAF and
GDF .
Proof: Since the best response vector functions BAF (ρ)
and BDF (ρ) are both standard (proved in Appendix C and
E), the proof of this proposition follows with reference to [25,
Thm. 2].
2) Implementation Discussion: Note that the distributed
nature of the above algorithm is based on modeling each link
as a single player. However, each link consists of three nodes
(i.e., source, relay, and destination), which are geographically
separated in practical networks. Thus, an efficient implementa-
tion of the proposed algorithm with the minimum information
sharing should be designed.
In our design, the relay node is expected to be the link
coordinator that undertakes the information collection and the
best-response computation. Here, we assume that the energy
consumed for the algorithm computations at the relay nodes
are negligible compared with the harvested energy used for
information forwarding since these computations are quite
simple. This assumption can be further supported by the rapid
development of the low-power chips. Next, we aim to identify
the information that is needed to collect or exchange for the
implementation of the proposed algorithm. According to the
best response functions given in (18), the relay Ri needs to
know the values of the parameters Xi, Yi, Zi, and Wi defined
in (6). To this end, the relay Ri should perform the following
tasks:
• Task 1: Measure the channel gains gii and hii, acquire the
transmission power Pi from its source, and then calculate
the value of Xi based on these information.
• Task 2: Measure3 the power of its received signal, acquire
the power of the received signal at the destination Di, and
then calculate the values of Yi, Zi, Wi.
• Task 3: Calculate the optimal power splitting ratio ρi
based on (18).
From the above description, we can observe that the over-
heads are required in transmitting the following three kinds of
information for each link in the proposed algorithm: (1) pilots
for estimating the channel state information (CSI) from source
to its dedicated relay and CSI from relay to destination, (2)
the value of transmit power from the source to relay, and (3)
the power of received signal at the destination, which needs
to be sent from the destination to its dedicated relay. The first
two kinds of overheads are only needed once for each channel
realization, while the third one is required in each iteration of
the proposed algorithm. From the above discussion, we can see
that in the proposed algorithm, only some local information
needs to be exchanged within each link and no information
needs to be exchanged among different links.
Finally, note that a possible termination criterion for the
proposed Algorithm 1 can be
[ρi (t+ 1)− ρi (t)] /ρi (t+ 1) ≤ ζ,
where ζ is a sufficiently small constant.
IV. EXTENSION TO HYBRID NETWORK
In this section, we generalize the proposed game-theoretical
power splitting scheme to a hybrid network containing both
AF and DF relays. The set of the links with AF relays and
DF relays are denoted by NAF and NDF , respectively. Before
formally describing the non-cooperative game for this case, it
is important to notice that for a given power splitting ratio pro-
file ρ−i, the amount of interference received by the destination
Di is fixed. This is because for a given realization of channels,
the interference at each destination is only determined by the
3The measurement of the signal power can be performed by the radio scene
analyzer [15].
7transmit powers of relays in other links and is independent
of the relaying protocols (i.e., AF or DF) adopted by these
relays. Thus, the achievable rate of the ith link in the hybrid
network can still be expressed by (7), when the AF relaying
protocol is adopted at the relay Ri, and by (11), when the DF
relaying protocol is adopted at the relay Ri.
Now, we can formulate the following non-cooperative game
for the considered hybrid network:
• Players: The N S-R-D links.
• Actions: Each link determines its power splitting ratio
ρi ∈ Ai to maximize the achievable rate for its own link.
• Utilities: The achievable rate
uHDi (ρi, ρ−i) =
{
uAFi (ρi, ρ−i) in (7), if i ∈ NAF
uDFi (ρi, ρ−i) in (11), if i ∈ NDF .(21)
For convenience, we denote the above non-cooperative
game as
GHD =
〈N , {Ai} ,{uHDi (ρi, ρ−i)}〉 . (22)
Subsequently, according to Proposition 1, Lemma 1, Propo-
sition 2, Lemma 2, and Proposition 3, we have the following
corollary regarding the best response function and the exis-
tence and uniqueness of the NE for the game GHD :
Corollary 1: The best response function of the ith link in
the game GHD can be expressed as
BHDi (ρ) =
{ BAFi (ρ) in (18), if i ∈ NAF
BDFi (ρ) in (19), if i ∈ NDF . (23)
Furthermore, the game GHD always possesses one and only
one NE. 
Then, replacing the best response update (20) in Algorithm
1 by the one in (23), we can have a best response-based
distributed algorithm for the links to achieve the NE of the
game GHD . This algorithm is referred to Algorithm 2, which
is omitted here due to its similarity with Algorithm 1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we will present some numerical results
to illustrate and validate the above theoretical analyses. To
obtain meaningful results, we restrict our attention to a linear
topology for each link. Specifically, Si-Ri-Di forms a straight
line with unit length, i.e., dSiDi = dSiRi+dRiDi = 1, ∀i ∈ N ,
with dXY denoting the distance between nodes X and Y . Note
that in order to obtain meaningful insights into the system
performance, we treat the node distances as constants in this
paper. In practical systems, the spatial node distributions [27],
[28] should be considered, but it will require a new analytical
framework, which is out of the scope of this paper and we
would like to consider it as our future work. The channels
between all transceiver pairs are assumed to be subject to
mutually independent Rayleigh fading. To take into account
the impact of path loss, we adopt the channel model that
E
{
|gij |2
}
=
(
dSiRj
)−τ
and E
{
|hij |2
}
=
(
dRiDj
)−τ
,
where τ ∈ [2, 5] is the path loss factor [29]. In all the
simulations, without loss of generality, we set σ2 = 1 and
η = 0.5.
We first consider a simple network consisting of two links
with the following randomly generated parameters:
[P1, P2] = [5.3080, 7.1917] , (24)[ |g11|2 |g12|2
|g21|2 |g22|2
]
=
[
2.1713 1.4836
3.0937 0.9773
]
, (25)
[ |h11|2 |h12|2
|h21|2 |h22|2
]
=
[
0.4475 1.5760
1.5406 2.6081
]
. (26)
Both links in the game GAF (GDF ) adopt the AF (DF)
relaying protocol, while link 1 implements the DF relaying
scheme and link 2 implements the AF relaying scheme in
the game GHD . In Fig. 3(a)-3(c), we first plot the best
response functions (i.e., ρ1 (ρ2) and ρ2 (ρ1)) of the three
games, respectively. With reference to [24], the intersection
points of the best response functions are actually the NEs
of the corresponding games. From Fig. 3(a)-3(c), we can see
that the two curves only admit one intersection point in all
cases, which indicates that all the formulated games in the
considered two-link network possess a unique NE. In Fig.
3(d)-3(f), the proposed algorithms are executed to achieve the
corresponding NEs from randomly generated initial points. It
can be seen from Fig. 3(d)-3(f) that the proposed algorithms
can converge to the corresponding NEs obtained in Fig. 3(a)-
3(c) from different starting points. Hence, the observations
from Fig. 3(a)-3(f) verify the correctness of our theoretical
analyses.
To show that the proposed algorithm can also converge to
the NE in multi-link scenarios, we illustrate its convergence
performance for an example of a randomly generated four-link
hybrid network in Fig. 4. As can be observed from Fig. 4, the
proposed algorithm can converge to the same values (i.e., the
NE) from two different initial points, which further validates
the theoretical analyses. Note that due to the space limitation,
we only show results in Figs. 3-4 for one random realization
of transmit powers and channel gains, although similar results
can also be shown for other realizations.
Next, we investigate the average sum-rate of the relay
interference networks that implement the proposed power
splitting scheme. We consider both a two-link scenario and a
multi-link scenario. For simplification and illustrative purpose,
we consider that all links in the considered networks are
mutually parallel. Thus, the two-link setting is characterized by
the interlink distance, denoted by dL. In the multi-link setting,
we assume that the distances between adjacent links are equal.
Hence, this scenario is characterized by the number of links
N and the distance between the farthest two links, denoted
by dmax. In the following figures, each curve is plotted by
averaging over the results from 10000 independent channel
realizations. In addition, it is straightforward to imagine that
the performance curves of the hybrid network should be
located between that of the AF and DF network. Thus, we
will omit the curves of hybrid networks in the following to
avoid crowded figures.
Fig. 5 illustrates the average sum-rate of a two-link network,
where the performances are compared across the optimal sum-
rate obtained by the centralized optimization problem (13)
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Fig. 3. The best response functions of the three formulated games and the convergence of Algorithm 1-2 from different starting points in the considered
two-link network with parameters given in (24)-(26).
solved via exhaustive search, the proposed game-theoretical
approach, the random scheme in which the power splitting
ratios are randomly generated over [0, 1]. Both AF and DF
networks with symmetric and asymmetric topologies are sim-
ulated. We can observe from Fig. 5 that the proposed game-
theoretical method outperforms the the random scheme in the
AF network when dL exceeds a certain value, and is always
superior to the random scheme in the DF network for all cases.
In addition, the performance gap between these two schemes
becomes larger when the inter-link distance dL increases.
Moreover, it can be seen from Fig. 5 that the proposed game-
theoretical approach suffers performance loss compared to the
optimal scheme when the inter-link distance is very small,
i.e., in high interference scenarios. However, as the inter-
link distance increases, it approaches the centralized optimal
scheme in the AF network and quickly coincides with the
centralized optimal scheme in the DF network. Therefore, we
can claim that the proposed game-theoretical approach can
achieve a near-optimal performance on average, especially for
the scenarios with medium and large interlink distance (i.e.,
relatively low and moderate interference).
Figs. 6 and 7 respectively demonstrate the impacts of the
number of links and the transmit powers on the average sum-
rates and average power splitting ratios of AF and DF networks
in the multi-link scenario, where all relays are assumed in
middle positions (i.e., dSiRi = dRiDi = 0.5, ∀i). In Fig. 6
(a), we plot the average sum-rate curves of the AF and DF
networks achieved by the proposed game-theoretical scheme
and the random scheme versus the number of links with
dmax = 5 and Pi = 15 dB, ∀i. Note that the performance
of the centralized optimal scheme is omitted here because the
corresponding optimization problem is non-convex and thus
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Fig. 4. Convergence of the proposed algorithm for a randomly generated
four-link hybrid network with two different initial points, NDF = [1 3] and
NAF = [2 4].
cannot be efficiently solved in a multi-link scenario. From
Fig. 6 (a), we observe that the average sum-rates of both
AF and DF networks first increase and then keep decreasing
with the growth of the number of links. This observation is
understandable. Specifically, the initial sum-rate increase is
actually a multiplexing gain as more links share the same
spectrum with relatively low mutual interference. Neverthe-
less, with a further increase in the number of links, the interlink
interference becomes stronger, which leads to a monotonically
decreasing sum-rate. We can also see from Fig. 6 (a) that
the proposed game-theoretical approach always outweighs the
random method in both AF and DF networks for all cases.
The performance gap between these two schemes in the DF
network is significantly larger than that in the AF networks.
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Fig. 5. The average sum-rates of two-link AF and DF networks for (a) symmetric network with dSiRi = dRiDi = 0.5 and Pi = 15 dB, ∀i = 1, 2, (b)
asymmetric network with dS1R1 = dR2D2 = 0.25 and Pi = 15 dB, ∀i = 1, 2.
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Fig. 6. The impact of link numbers on (a) average sum-rate and (b) average power splitting ratio in AF and DF networks with dmax = 5 and Pi = 15
(dB), ∀i.
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Fig. 7. The impact of the transmit powers on (a) average sum-rate and (b) average power splitting ratio in AF and DF networks with dmax = 5 and N = 5.
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Fig. 8. The average rate of the best and worst links in AF and DF networks
with dmax = 5 and N = 5.
This indicates that the proposed game-theoretical approach can
achieve a higher performance improvement in a DF network
than the one in a AF network. In addition, it can be observed
from Fig. 6 (a) that the performance gap decreases gradually
as the number of links increases, which is due to a more severe
interference. Fig. 6 (b) depicts the average power splitting
ratios4 of both AF and DF networks, when the proposed game-
theoretical scheme is implemented. We can observe from this
figure that the average power splitting ratio of the AF networks
is always larger than that of the DF networks. Furthermore,
the average power splitting ratios of both AF and DF networks
experience a steady increase when the number of links grows.
A similar phenomenon can be observed from Fig. 7 (b), in
which the curves for the average power splitting ratios of both
AF and DF networks are plotted versus the sources’ transmit
powers. This is because increasing the number of links and
rising the transmit powers of all links achieve the same effect
as increased mutual interference. The impact of the transmit
powers of all links on the average sum-rates of both AF and
DF networks is shown in Fig. 7 (a). As can be observed from
this figure, the average sum-rate achieved by the proposed
game-theoretical approach steadily increases from a low to a
moderate SNR region and tends to get saturated at high SNR,
above 20 (dB). This indicates that at high SNR, the power
control at the sources should be jointly considered with the
power splitting at the relays to further improve the sum-rate,
which will be considered in our future work. Finally, we can
see from Figs. 6 (a) and 7 (a) that a DF network can achieve
a higher average sum-rate than an AF network with the same
settings.
In Fig. 8, we plot the average rate curves for the best
and worst links in both AF and DF networks with the same
network setting as in Fig. 7. Similar phenomena shown in
Fig. 7 (a) can also be observed in this figure. Besides, we can
4Since plotting the curve for each link’s power splitting ratio will create
too many curves, which is difficult to illustrate, we choose the average power
splitting ratio of all links as the performance metric for the purpose of
facilitating the illustration. This metric can effectively reflect the changes of
the ratios in the majority of links.
see from Fig. 8 that compared with the random scheme, the
proposed game-theoretical scheme can effectively improve the
average rates of the best and worst links in both AF and DF
networks. Furthermore, this performance improvement in the
DF network is shown to be more significant than that in the
AF network.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we developed a game-theoretical framework to
address the distributed power splitting problem for simultane-
ous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) in relay
interference channels. We formulated non-cooperative games
for three different network scenarios, in which each link is
modeled as a strategic player who aims to maximize its indi-
vidual achievable rate by choosing the dedicated relay’s power
splitting ratio. We showed that the formulated games always
achieve a unique Nash equilibrium (NE). Best response-based
distributed algorithms with provable convergence were also de-
veloped to achieve the NEs. The numerical results showed that
the proposed algorithms can converge to the corresponding
NEs from different starting points, and the developed game-
theoretical approach can achieve a near-optimal network-wide
performance on average, especially for the scenarios with
relatively low and moderate interference.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Firstly, it is straightforward to observe that the utility
function uAFi (ρi, ρ−i) is continuous in ρi. Then, a feasible
method to prove the quasi-concavity of the utility function
uAFi (ρi, ρ−i) is to use the following theorem [30, pp. 99]:
Theorem 2: A continuous function f : R → R is quasi-
concave if and only if at least one of the following conditions
holds:
• f is non-decreasing
• f is non-increasing
• there is a point c ∈ dom f such that for t ≤ c (and
t ∈ dom f ), f is non-decreasing, and for t ≥ c (and
t ∈ dom f ), f is non-increasing.
Next, let us prove the quasi-concavity of the utility function
by showing that it is first non-decreasing and then non-
increasing in the feasible domain. This will be achieved by
demonstrating that the first-order derivative of the utility is no
less than zero when the variable is smaller than a certain value
and is no larger than zero in the remaining domain.
To proceed, we derive the first-order derivative of the
function uAFi (ρi, ρ−i) with respective to (w.r.t) ρi, which,
after some algebra manipulations, can be expressed as
∂uAFi
(
ρi, ρ−i
)
∂ρi
=
1
ln 2
Ci(ρi)
2 − 2Diρi +Di
[ρi (1− ρi)YiZi − Ciρi +Di]2/XiZi + ρi (1− ρi)
,
(27)
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where
Ci = (Xi + Yi) (Wi + 1)− Zi, (28a)
Di = (Xi + Yi + 1) (Wi + 1) , (28b)
are defined for the simplicity of notations.
After a careful observation on the right-hand side (RHS)
of (27), we can deduce that the sign of ∂u
AF
i (ρi,ρ−i)
∂ρi
is only
determined by the numerator
κi (ρi) = Ci(ρi)
2 − 2Diρi +Di, (29)
since the denominator is always large than zero. To further
determine the monotonicity of the function uAFi (ρi, ρ−i), we
need to investigate the properties of the quadratic function
κi (ρi) on the feasible set of ρi (i.e., [0, 1]). Firstly, we note
that
κi (0) = Di > 0, (30a)
κi (1) = Ci −Di = −(Zi +Wi + 1) < 0. (30b)
Then, we can draw all possible shapes of the function κi (ρi)
versus ρi for different cases, as depicted in Fig. 9. From Fig. 9,
we can see that in spite of the sign of the term Ci, there always
exists a point ǫi ∈ [0, 1] such that κi (ǫi) = 0, κi (ρi) > 0 for
ρi < ǫi, and κi (ρi) < 0 for ρi > ǫi. This means that on its
feasible domain, the function uAFi (ρi, ρ−i) is increasing in ρi
before the point ǫi and is decreasing in ρi after the point ǫi.
Then, according to Theorem 2, we can claim that the utility
function uAFi (ρi, ρ−i) is quasi-concave in ρi.
In addition, it is easy to check that the feasible set Ai is
compact and convex and the utility function uAFi (ρi, ρ−i)
is continuous in ρ for any i ∈ N . Then, with reference to
Theorem 1, we can further claim that the formulated game
GAF for the pure AF network possesses at least one NE.
For the formulated game GDF , it is straightforward to check
that both γDFi,1 and γDFi,2 are concave functions of ρi. Moreover,
the minimum of two concave functions is also concave,
which means that the SINR γDFi is a concave function of
the strategy ρi. Since the function f (x) = log (1 + x) is
concave and non-decreasing, we can claim5 that the utility
function uDFi (ρi, ρ−i) is concave (quasi-concave) in ρi. Thus,
according to Theorem 1, we can conclude that the formulated
game GDF also admits at least one NE. This completes the
proof.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
According to the analysis in Appendix A, for a given power
splitting profile ρ, the expression of the parameter ǫi is actually
the best response function of the ith link. Moreover, ǫi is one
solution of the following quadratic equation:
κi (ǫi) = Ci(ǫi)
2 − 2Diǫi +Di = 0. (31)
According to the value of Ci, we divide the derivation for the
expression of ǫi to three cases:
(a) When Ci = 0: The equation in (31) is simplified as
− 2Diǫi +Di = 0. (32)
5The composite function h (x) = f (g (x)) is concave in x if f (x) is
concave and non-decreasing, and g (x) is concave [30].
Thus, ǫi = 1/2 when Ci = 0.
(b) When Ci > 0: In this case, the quadratic equation in
(31) possesses the following two roots:
ǫi,1 =
Di +
√
(Di)
2 − CiDi
Ci
=
√
Di
(√
Di +
√
Di − Ci
)
Di − (Di − Ci)
=
√
Di√
Di −
√
Di − Ci
,
(33)
ǫi,2 =
Di −
√
(Di)
2 − CiDi
Ci
=
√
Di√
Di +
√
Di − Ci
.
(34)
Since Ci > 0 and Di > Di − Ci > 0, we have ǫi,1 > 1 and
1
2 < ǫi,2 < 1. Thus, the valid expression of ǫi when Ci > 0
is given by
ǫi = ǫi,2 =
√
Di√
Di +
√
Di − Ci
, (35)
because the feasible set of ǫi is [0, 1].
(c) When Ci < 0: In this case, we have Di−Ci > Di > 0.
Thus, the roots ǫi,1 < 0 and 0 < ǫi,2 < 12 . Hence, the valid
expression of ǫi when Ci < 0 is the same with the case when
Ci > 0, i.e.,
ǫi = ǫi,2 =
√
Di√
Di +
√
Di − Ci
. (36)
Therefore, substituting the expressions of Ci and Di defined
in (28) and setting BAFi (ρ) = ǫi, we can obtain the desired
result in (18) for the best response function of the ith link in
pure AF network. This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
To prove this proposition, we need to show that the function
BAF (ρ) for the formulated game is standard. Firstly, based on
the analysis in Appendix B, it is easy to verify that the best
response function satisfies the conditions in Definition 1 when
(Xi + Yi) (Wi + 1) = Zi (i.e., Ci = 0). Thus, we only need
to show the function
BAFi (ρ) =
√
(Xi + Yi + 1) (Wi + 1)√
(Xi + Yi + 1) (Wi + 1) +
√
Zi +Wi + 1(37)
also satisfies the three properties of the standard function for
any i, which are proved in the following:
(1) Positivity: According to the analysis in Appendix B,
for any player i and any strategy profile ρ, the best response
function BAFi (ρ) is always larger than 0, which guarantees
the positivity of the function BAF (ρ).
(2) Monotonicity: Recall the definition of the terms Xi, Yi,
Zi and Wi in (6). We can see that only the term Wi is related
to the strategy profile ρ. Suppose ρ and ρ′ are two different
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Fig. 9. All possible shapes for the function κi (ρi) versus ρi for different cases.
strategy profiles and ρ ≥ ρ′. Then, the corresponding best
response functions of any player i can be written as
BAFi (ρ) =
√
(Xi + Yi + 1) (Wi + 1)√
(Xi + Yi + 1) (Wi + 1) +
√
Zi +Wi + 1
,
(38)
and
BAFi (ρ′) =
√
(Xi + Yi + 1) (W ′i + 1)√
(Xi + Yi + 1) (W ′i + 1) +
√
Zi +W ′i + 1
,
(39)
where W ′i =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i ρ
′
jη
(∑N
n=1 Pn|gnj |2
)
|hji|2/σ2.
After a careful comparison of (38) and (39), we can see that
all the terms in BAFi (ρ) and BAFi (ρ′) are the same except Wi
and W ′i . Hence, the inequity BAFi (ρ) ≥ BAFi (ρ′) holds if we
can prove BAFi (Wi) ≥ BAFi (W ′i ). Moreover, we have Wi ≥
W ′i since ρ ≥ ρ′. Thus, the proof of BAFi (ρ) ≥ BAFi (ρ′)
is equivalent to proving that the BAFi (Wi) is non-decreasing
in Wi. To proceed, we re-write the best response function
BAFi (ρ) as
BAFi (ρ) =
1
1 +
√
Zi
(Xi+Yi+1)(Wi+1)
+ 1Xi+Yi+1
, (40)
From (40), we can easily observe that BAFi (ρ) is increasing
in Wi, which complete the proof of monotonicity.
(3) Scalability: For any given α > 1, we have
αBAFi (ρ) =
α
1 +
√
Zi
(Xi+Yi+1)(Wi+1)
+ 1Xi+Yi+1
=
1
1
α +
√
Zi
α2(Xi+Yi+1)(Wi+1)
+ 1α2(Xi+Yi+1)
>
1
1 +
√
Zi
(Xi+Yi+1)(αWi+1)
+ 1(Xi+Yi+1)
= BAFi (αρ) ,
(41)
which proves that the best response function BAFi (ρ) meets
the scalability property. This completes the proof.
D. Proof of Lemma 2
Let ρ∗i denote the best response of the ith link corresponding
to a given power splitting strategy profile ρ. That is, ρ∗i is the
maximizer of uDFi (ρ). It can be easily observed that γDFi,1
in (8) is monotonically decreasing in ρi, while γDFi,2 in (10)
is monotonically increasing in ρi. Thus, ρ∗i must satisfy the
following condition:
γDFi,1 (ρ
∗
i ) = γ
DF
i,2 (ρ
∗
i ) . (42)
Substituting the expression of γDFi,1 and γDFi,2 , we have
(1− ρ∗i )Xi
(1− ρ∗i )Yi + 1
=
ρ∗iZi
Wi + 1
. (43)
After rearranging (43), we obtain
YiZi(ρ
∗
i )
2 − [Xi (Wi + 1) + YiZi + Zi] ρ∗i
+Xi (Wi + 1) = ℓi (ρ
∗
i ) = 0.
(44)
Note that (44) is a quadratic equality of ρ∗i , denoted by
ℓi (ρ
∗
i ) = 0. Thus, the value of ρ∗i can be obtained by solving
the quadratic equality in (44).
We note that
YiZi > 0, (45a)
ℓi (0) = Xi (Wi + 1) > 0, (45b)
ℓi (1) = −Zi < 0. (45c)
Based on (45), we can deduce that the quadratic equality
ℓi (ρ
∗
i ) = 0 admits two roots lying in (0, 1) and (1,+∞).
Since the feasible set of the power splitting ratio is [0, 1], the
valid value of ρ∗i can only be the smaller root of the equality
ℓi (ρ
∗
i ) = 0. Mathematically, we have,
ρ∗i = [(XiWi +Xi + YiZi + Zi)−√
(XiWi +Xi − YiZi + Zi)2 + 4YiZ2i
]
/ (2YiZi)
= BDFi (ρ) ,
(46)
which completes the proof.
E. Proof of Proposition 3
Similar to the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix C,
the proof of this proposition follows by showing that the
function BDF (ρ) of the formulated game is standard. In the
following, we show that the function BDF (ρ) satisfies the
three properties of the standard function.
(1) Positivity: As shown in Appendix D, for any player i
and any strategy profile ρ, the best response function BDFi (ρ)
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is always larger than 0, which guarantees the positivity of the
function BDF (ρ).
(2) Monotonicity: Suppose ρ and ρ′ are two different strat-
egy profiles and ρ ≥ ρ′. Then, the corresponding best response
functions of any player i can be written as
BDFi (ρ) = [(XiWi +Xi + YiZi + Zi)−√
(XiWi +Xi − YiZi + Zi)2 + 4YiZ2i
]
/ (2YiZi) ,
(47)
and
BDFi (ρ′) = [(XiW ′i +Xi + YiZi + Zi)−√
(XiW ′i +Xi − YiZi + Zi)2 + 4YiZ2i
]
/ (2YiZi) ,
(48)
where Xi, Yi, Zi, Wi are defined in (6), and W ′i =∑N
j=1,j 6=i ρ
′
jη
(∑N
n=1 Pn|gnj |2
)
|hji|2/σ2.
Analogous to the analyses in Appendix C, the proof
of BDFi (ρ) ≥ BDFi (ρ′) is equivalent to proving that
∂BDFi (Wi)
Wi
≥ 0. Expanding ∂BDFi (Wi)Wi ≥ 0, we have
∂BDFi (Wi)
Wi
=
Xi
2YiZi

1− XiWi +Xi − YiZi + Zi√
(XiWi +Xi − YiZi + Zi)2 + 4YiZ2i

 .
(49)
Since the term Xi/(2YiZi) > 0 and the term in the square
bracket of (49) is always large than zero, we can claim that
∂BDFi (Wi)
Wi
> 0, which complete the proof of monotonicity.
(3) Scalability: For any α > 1, we define the function
Fi (α,ρ) = αBDFi (ρ) − BDFi (αρ). Then, the proof of the
scalability is equivalent to proving that Fi (α,ρ) > 0 for
any α > 1. Firstly, it is obvious that Fi (1, ρ) = 0. Thus,
a sufficient condition for Fi (α,ρ) > 0 is that Fi (α,ρ) is an
increasing function of α, i.e., ∂Fi(α,ρ)∂α > 0. To proceed, we
first derive the first-order and second-order partial derivatives
of Fi (α,ρ) w.r.t α and obtain
∂Fi (α,ρ)
∂α
=
1
2YiZi
{Xi + YiZi + Zi
+
(αXiWi +Xi − YiZi + Zi)XiWi√
(αXiWi +Xi − YiZi + Zi)2 + 4YiZi2
−
√
(XiWi +Xi − YiZi + Zi)2 + 4YiZ2i
}
,
(50)
∂2Fi (α,ρ)
∂α2
=
2Zi(XiWi)
2
[
(αXiWi +Xi − YiZi + Zi)2 + 4YiZ2i
]3/2
(51)
From (51), we can see that ∂2Fi(α,ρ)∂α2 is always larger than
0, which indicates that ∂Fi(α,ρ)∂α is increasing in α. Thus, a
sufficient condition for Fi (α,ρ) > 0 can now be simplified
as
∂Fi(α,ρ)
∂α
∣∣∣
α=1
> 0. Substituting α = 1 into (50), we get
∂Fi (α,ρ)
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=1
=
1
2YiZi
{Xi + YiZi + Zi
+
(XiWi +Xi − YiZi + Zi)XiWi√
(XiWi +Xi − YiZi + Zi)2 + 4YiZ2i
−
√
(XiWi +Xi − YiZi + Zi)2 + 4YiZ2i
}
.
(52)
To proceed, we derive the first-order derivative for the RHS
of (52) with respect to Wi. After some algebraic manipula-
tions, we obtain
∂
(
∂Fi(α,ρ)
∂α
∣∣∣
α=1
)
/∂Wi
=
2ZiWiX
2
i[
(XiWi +Xi − YiZi + Zi)2 + 4YiZ2i
]3/2 ,
which is shown to be always positive. Thus, ∂Fi(α,ρ)∂α
∣∣∣
α=1
is
an increasing function in Wi. Since Wi > 0, we further have
∂Fi (α,ρ)
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=1
>
∂Fi (α,ρ)
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=1,Wi=0
=
1
2YiZi
{Xi + YiZi + Zi
−
√
(Xi + YiZi + Zi)
2 − 4XiYiZi
}
> 0.
(53)
Therefore, we can claim that αBDFi (ρ) > BDFi (αρ), which
completes the proof.
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